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Abstract
It has been more than a decade since China began her experiment of “One Country, Two
Systems” in Hong Kong (HK). It is now generally assumed that the relationship between the legal
systems of these two jurisdictions is monistic. Analysing post-Handover constitutional case law in
HK, including a recent landmark decision on sovereign immunity, FG Hemisphere Associates
LLC v. Democratic Republic of Congo, this article challenges this assumption and argues that the
relationship between the two legal systems is best conceptualized as a form of legal pluralism
found in the European Union.
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong (HK) some thirteen years ago, 
she put in place an unprecedented constitutional order of “One Country, Two 
Systems” (OCTS), whereby HK continues to practise the common law legal 
system within the Socialist, civil law legal system of China. It is now generally 
assumed that the relationship between the two legal systems is monistic, meaning 
that HK’s system is part of and subordinate to the Chinese legal system. There are 
two kinds of such monist conception. Kelsenian monists argue that the legal 
system of HK is subordinate to that of China since the former is derived from the 
latter; judicial behaviour is irrelevant for determining what the relationship 
between the systems is.1 Hartian monists, on the other hand, consider judicial 
behaviour relevant for determining the relationship between the systems, and 
argue that HK’s system is subordinate to the Chinese system because judicial 
officials in HK and Mainland China have accepted such hierarchy.2  
This article casts doubt on both of these common conceptions. I argue that 
the Kelsenian approach is counter-intuitive. As against Hartian monism, I 
question the empirical basis for its application to HK. There has been little, if any, 
analysis showing that, as an empirical fact, the judiciary of HK has unequivocally 
accepted the superior position of the Chinese legal system within HK. Analysing 
post-Handover constitutional case law in HK, including a recent landmark 
decision on sovereign immunity, FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v. Democratic 
Republic of Congo3 (Congo Case), I argue that judicial behaviour on the issue of 
hierarchy is at best inconclusive. I contend that institutions in both sides of the 
HK-Mainland border have been engaging in institutional dialogues with each 
other on various questions of hierarchy, but no conclusions have emerged yet. 
Such inconclusive judicial behaviour does not sit comfortably with the Hartian 
monist position. 
This article suggests that the model of legal pluralism developed from the 
context of the European Union (EU) better captures the unique OCTS 
configuration. This is one of the first comprehensive attempts at applying the 
pluralist lens from EU to analyse OCTS.4 In the following, I will first define three 
                                                 
1 The Chinese government and some scholars share this view. See infra notes 27, 29, 30 and 
accompanying text. 
2 This view is usually not made expressly but intimated. See infra notes 43, 44, 72, 73 and 
accompanying text. 
3 [2010] 2 HKLRD 66 (HK Court of Appeal) (on appeal). Substantive hearing in the HK Court of 
Final Appeal is set down for March 2011.  
4 There were previous attempts to apply and ultimately dismiss the model of legal pluralism for 
analysing the relationship between the Mainland Chinese and HK legal systems. See Yash Ghai, 
“Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and Procedure” in Johannes MM Chan, HL 
Fu, Yash Ghai, eds., Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate: Conflict Over Interpretation (HK: HK 
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 possible frameworks – monism, dualism and pluralism – for conceptualizing the 
Mainland-HK legal order. Part III will then offer an overview of the relationship 
between the two legal systems. Parts IV and V will challenge the Kelsenian 
monist and Hartian monist positions respectively. Part VI will then consider 
dualism and pluralism as alternative models to monism, and argue that pluralism 
best encapsulates the relationship between the two legal systems.   
 
II. MONISM, DUALISM AND PLURALISM 
 
Monism sees two or more legal systems co-existing in one territory as 
hierarchically ranked. The subordinate system is a partial order of the higher 
system. For Hartian monists, two legal systems are objectively hierarchically 
ranked if and only if the hierarchy is accepted by judicial officials within both 
systems.5 For Kelsenian monists, such objective hierarchy is established by one 
system being ultimately validated by the grundnorm of another.6  
Dualism, on the other hand, sees the two legal systems as distinct orders, 
and views the effects of one order as operating through another. Taking the 
relationship between international law and national law as an example, monism 
would view either the national legal order as part of the international order or vice 
versa. On the other hand, dualism would view the international system and 
national system as separate legal orders, with the effects of the former operating 
in a territory through national legal sources, and national jurisdiction deferring to, 
but also ultimately retaining the decision on whether to defer to, the unconditional 
effects of international law within defined subject spheres.7 
                                                                                                                                     
University Press, 2000) [hereinafter “HK’s Constitutional Debate”], at 10; Yash Ghai, “The 
Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the HKSAR: Question of Technique or 
Politics?” (2007) 37 Hong Kong Law Journal [hereinafter “HKLJ”] 363, at 367. For my response 
to Ghai’s argument, see infra note 25 and accompanying text. In addition, Alice Tay explained 
how legal pluralism did not fit the ideology of communist China. Alice ES Tay, “People’s 
Republic of China” in Poh-Ling Tan, Asian Legal Systems (Butterworths, 1997), at 63. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to fully respond to this argument. Suffice to say that this article 
focuses on what the relationship between legal systems in fact is, which may or may not be in line 
with the ideology of the ruling government.  
5 R Barents, “The Precedence of EU Law from the Perspective of Constitutional Pluralism” (2009) 
5 European Constitutional Law Review [hereinafter “EuConst”] 421, at 427. 
6 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Max Knight (trs.) (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1978) 198-205, 214-217.  
7 Kelsen, ibid, at 328-329; M La Torre, “Legal Pluralism as Evolutionary Achievement of 
Community Law” (1999) 12(2) Ratio Juris 192-193; P Eleftheriadis, “Pluralism and Integrity” 
(2009) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 43/2009 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1486151> (last accessed 18 August 2010), at 
6-8, 21-28. 
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 Despite their differences, monism and dualism are both based on certain 
classical assumptions about law. First, law must be free from inconsistencies. 
Within one territory, there must always be a single answer to a legal question. For 
monism, the answer will be found using the hierarchically ranked rules; for 
dualism, the answer will be found in the rules of the legal system that presides in 
the subject matter in question. It cannot be the case that on one legal question 
there are inconsistent answers deriving from different legal systems operating in 
the same territory. Secondly, only one legal system takes charge within each 
territory. For monism, the higher legal order takes charge. For dualism, the effects 
of the “outside” legal order always operate through the sanction of the domestic 
order, and in that sense the latter order takes charge within the territory.  
These classical confines have handicapped monism and dualism in 
explaining a peculiar legal configuration that has arisen in the EU, whereby the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the one hand, and certain member states’ 
courts on the other, make competing claims of law and legal supremacy on the 
same population within those member states. Some jurists working on EU law 
have thus turned to legal pluralism as a new way of conceptualizing the 
relationship between the EU legal system and member states’ legal systems. 
There are numerous strands of legal pluralism in existing literature.8 The 
anthropological strand emphasizes the existence of non-state law, and poses legal 
pluralism as a response to legal centrism whereby state law is the only source of 
law. Legal pluralism has also been used to refer to legal polycentricity, that is, the 
use of various sources of law within one state legal system. Thirdly, legal 
pluralism has been used to encapsulate the coexistence of two or more 
autonomous or semi-autonomous legal orders in the same context.9  
The model of legal pluralism developed in the EU context, which is also 
the model that this paper relies on, builds upon the third strand of legal 
pluralism.10 Posing a challenge to the above-stated assumptions about law, this 
                                                 
8 Discussions on legal pluralism have been classified in different ways. See for e.g. William 
Twining’s classification in “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective” (2010) 20 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 47; and Poh-Ling Tan and Alice ES Tay’s 
classification in Poh-Ling Tan, supra note 4, at 396-405. For discussions on legal pluralism 
generally, see J Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism & 
Unofficial Law 1; DJ Galligan, Law in Modern Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 162-170; SE Merry, “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22(5) Law & Society Review 869; GR 
Woodman, “The Idea of Legal Pluralism” in B Dupret, M Berger, L al-Zwaini, eds., Legal 
Pluralism in the Arab World (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 3-19; M Chiba, Legal Pluralism: 
Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 
1989); H Petersen and H Zahle, eds., Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995).  
9 This distinction follows that made by William Twining in ibid, at 488-489. 
10 For discussions on pluralism in the EU, see e.g. sources in supra notes 5 and 7, and N 
MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); N Walker, 
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 model presents two or more legal systems emanating from the state and/or multi-
state polity as interacting in a heterarchical rather than hierarchical manner in the 
same territory. This means that the legal systems can make competing and 
conflicting claims of law and legal supremacy on the same population, with no 
higher legal authority to arbitrate competing claims.11 Which claim of law is 
superior, and which legal system ranks higher, depend on which legal system’s 
perspective one is looking from.12 The population (both officials and the general 
public) in that territory will potentially be faced with multiple inconsistent rules of 
recognition – a plurality of legal answers to the same question.13 Jurists have 
claimed that these ideas on legal pluralism may have implications for 
constitutional, supranational and international law beyond the European setting.14 
This article will show that these insights enlighten one’s understanding of the 
Mainland-HK legal configuration. 
 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND HK 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration15 (JD) and the HK Basic Law16 (BL) (highest 
law in HK) sought largely to segregate the legal systems of HK and Mainland 
China so as to minimize conflicts between them. Under the JD and BL, the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) shall be vested with independent 
judicial power including that of final adjudication.17 Only national laws that are 
listed in Annex III of the BL (limited to defence, foreign affairs and other matters 
                                                                                                                                     
“The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65(3) MLR 317; N Walker, “Late Sovereignty in 
the European Union” and MP Maduro, “Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism 
in Action” in N Walker, ed., Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing, 2003) 54, 501-537; M 
Rosenfeld, “Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism” 
(2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 415; NW Barber, “Legal Pluralism” (2006) 
12(3) European Law Journal 306, 327-329; PC Oliver, The Constitution of Independence (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 311. 
11 These features are gathered from studying the sources ibid.  
12 This is MacCormick’s “radical pluralism”. See MacCormick, supra note 10, at 97-121. 
13 Barber, supra note 10, at 306-308, 316-327. On the rule of recognition generally, see HLA Hart, 
The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); J Raz, The Concept of a Legal 
System (New York: Oxford University Press, reprinted 2003) 187-202; J Raz, The Authority of 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 78-102. 
14 E.g. Eleftheriadis, supra note 7 at 3. 
15 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong 
(signed 19 December 1984, entered into force 30 June 1985) UKTS 26 Cmnd. 9543. 
16 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China, Adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990. 
17 Art. 19, BL; cl. 3(3), JD. 
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 outside HK’s autonomy (“excluded affairs”)) shall apply in HK.18 The systems 
and policies to be practised in HK and all local laws shall conform to the BL.19 In 
that sense, the BL has been considered the “constitution” of HK.20 Institutions in 
the HK legal system can interpret and amend all local laws, except that the final 
power of interpreting and amending the BL is vested with Mainland organs.21 The 
two legal systems are, by and large, separated. 
However, they intersect in important ways. One significant point of 
intersection lies with the interpretation of the BL. Art. 158, BL divides the 
responsibility for interpreting the BL between the Mainland Chinese and HK 
systems in a way inspired by the former art. 177 of the EC Treaty.22 In line with 
the Mainland government’s unitary conception of power, art. 158(1) states that 
the power of interpreting the BL lies with the Standing Committee (NPCSC) of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC), a Party-controlled legislature. Yet HK 
courts are authorised to interpret on their own, during adjudication, provisions 
which are within the scope of HK’s autonomy.23 HK courts may also interpret 
provisions on excluded affairs (“excluded provisions”), but if such interpretation 
is needed to render a final and non-appealable judgment, HK courts shall seek a 
binding interpretation of the relevant excluded provisions from the NPCSC before 
making the judgment (c.f. art. 177(3) EC).24 This is commonly known as the 
judicial reference or preliminary ruling procedure. As will be explained in section 
V(A), ambiguities in the BL over the arrangements for interpreting the BL, as 
well as other points of intersection between the two legal systems, have paved the 
way for contrary understandings of these issues by HK courts and Mainland 
institutions. The text of the BL is obscure, for instance, on the following 
intersection points: 
                                                 
18 Art. 18 BL.  
19 Art. 11 BL.  
20 HK courts have frequently referred to the BL as the constitution of HK. The use of the term 
“constitution” to describe the BL has not been uncontroversial. The Chinese government insists 
that there is only one constitution within China, i.e. the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China.   
21 Arts, 158-159, BL. The final power of interpreting the BL is vested with the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, while the final power of amending the BL is vested 
with the National People’s Congress. 
22 Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht consolidated version, 1 November 1993) 92/c 191/01, 
now renumbered as art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (30 March 
2010) Volume 53 C83. For a comparison between the two reference schemes, see Wang, infra 
note 30, at 216-218; AHY Chen, “The Court of Final Appeal’s Ruling in the ‘Illegal Migrant’ 
Children Case: A Critical Commentary on the Application of Article 158 of the Basic Law” in 
HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 114-141; Y Ghai, “Litigating the Basic Law” in HK’s 
Constitutional Debate, supra note 4, at 35-36. 
23 Art. 158(2), BL. 
24 Art. 158(3), BL. 
5
Chan: Reconceptualising the Mainland-Hong Kong Legal Order
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
  1. whether NPC acts that are applicable to HK or norms of the BL prevail in 
HK in case of conflict; 
2. whether norms of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) or BL norms prevail in HK in case of conflict; 
3. whether HK courts are the final arbiter of constitutionality in HK, and can 
thus decline to give effect to applicable NPC acts or provisions in the PRC 
constitution that contravene the BL;  
4. whether the foundation for the operation of Mainland law in HK rests with 
the BL or the PRC Constitution; 
5. whether HK courts retain the competence to define the limits of its own 
competence (the power described by German courts as “kompetenz-
kompetenz”); 
6. In relation to art. 158, BL: 
a. Whether the NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL is free-standing – 
meaning, procedurally, the power can be exercised without judicial 
reference from HK courts; and substantively, it can be exercised in 
relation to all provisions in the BL, including provisions that are 
within the scope of HK’s autonomy; 
b. How the stated criteria for HK courts to seek a preliminary ruling from 
the NPCSC are to be applied in practice.  
  
It is suitable at this juncture to deal with one argument against the use of legal 
pluralism in analysing the relationship between the HK and Mainland systems. 
According to Yash Ghai, legal pluralism is not relevant here, because the two 
systems mostly operate in different geographical spheres without interference 
from the other.25 While it is acknowledged that the most interesting questions 
regarding pluralism arise where the two systems intersect (this explains why my 
analysis focuses on cases of intersection), it cannot be said that pluralism is 
entirely irrelevant for conceptualising the two systems where they apparently 
operate without interference from each other. For example, monism sees the HK 
system as subordinate to the Chinese system even where the former is operating 
independently; according to one monist conception, the former’s independent 
operation is only possible because it is authorised by the latter. (This view will be 
explained in the next section.) This article challenges this predominant view, and 
argues that the two systems are unranked, both when the systems intersect and 
when they operate without interference from each other.   
 
                                                 
25 Ghai, “Litigating the Basic Law” in HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 10; Ghai, “The 
Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the HKSAR: Question of Technique or 
Politics?”, supra note 4 at 367. This point has also been made by the anonymous reviewer.  
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 IV.  THE CASE AGAINST KELSENIAN MONISM 
 
A.  Kelsenian monism 
 
The Kelsenian monist position is advanced by the Chinese government and some 
scholars. This position states that: 
 
(i) A legal system is hierarchically subordinate to another system if it is 
validated by a norm of the latter system (Kelsenian Theory of Law); 
(ii) The highest law in HK (the BL) is promulgated by an NPC decision,26 
which was made pursuant to art. 31 of the PRC constitution (Empirical 
premise); 
(iii) Therefore the HK legal system is subordinate to the Chinese legal system. 
 
Such logic is rarely set out systematically by officials and scholars, but can be 
implicated from their works and opinions. For example, Albert Chen argued that 
Kelsen’s theory of the grundnorm best explained the nature of the constitutional 
transition in HK; that after the Handover, the grundnorm of HK’s legal system 
had become the PRC Constitution.27 In criticising the HK Court of Final Appeal’s 
(CFA) judgment in Ng Ka Ling,28 four prominent Mainland scholars, whose 
views reflect that of the Chinese government, argued that the PRC Constitution 
conferred unchallengable power to the NPC, as a result of which the CFA could 
not challenge any NPC decision.29 Wang Shuwen, member of the Basic Law 
Drafting Committee, emphasized in his introductory account of the BL that the 
PRC Constitution constituted the legal basis of the BL and that answers to 
questions of hierarchy followed from this.30 
According to the Kelsenian monist position, if we bear in mind the 
hierarchy of systems, many doubts surrounding the relationship between systems 
can be clarified logically. If despite rules of hierarchy disputes between the 
                                                 
26 Decision of the National People’s Congress on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the Third Session of the 
Seventh National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990. 
27 AHY Chen, “The Provisional Legislative Council of the SAR” (1997) 27 HKLJ 1, 9-10. For a 
general analysis of Kelsen and Hart’s theories to the Chinese and HK legal systems, see R Wacks, 
“One Country, Two Grundnormen? The Basic Law and the Basic Norm” in R Wacks, ed., Hong 
Kong, China and 1997: Essays in Legal Theory (HK: HK University Press, 1997) at 151. 
28 Ng Ka Ling and others v. Director of Immigration [1999] 1 HKLRD 315.  
29 Press release by the New China News Agency (6 February 1999) [in Chinese], English 
translation by JMM Chan printed in HK’s Constitutional Debate, at 53-59.  
30 Wang Shuwen, ed., Introduction to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, 2nd edn., (Law Press China and Joint Publishing (HK) Co Ltd, 1997) at 46, 54, 59, 62-65, 
141-150, 178; Xiao Weiyun, One Country, Two Systems: An Account of the Drafting of the HK 
Basic Law (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2001) at 129, 131, 161.  
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 systems still occur, then according to monist logic, they should be resolved using 
the rules of the higher legal order, that is, the Mainland Chinese legal order.  
 
B.  Challenging the Kelsenian Theory of Law 
 
I seek to challenge point (i), i.e. the Kelsenian Theory of Law. Kelsenians contend 
that as a general principle, a legal system is authorized by a law of another system 
if that law purports to authorize the former system.31 It does not matter whether 
judges in the former legal system recognize the authority of that law. Criticisms 
against this position are well-documented,32 so my arguments here will focus on 
how it fails to account for the realities of the relationship of the Mainland-HK 
legal systems.  
 
1.  Illustration (1): a hypothetical UK act 
 
Let us first consider a hypothetical example. It is a historical fact that before 
China’s resumption of sovereignty over HK, the UK legal system purported to 
validate the HK legal system. The status of the UK legal system as the validating 
source of HK law was recognized by HK courts then. However, since the 
Handover in 1997, a law enacted in the PRC legal system, the BL, has sought to 
authorize the operation of the HKSAR legal system. All references in HK laws to 
the authorizing force of the UK legal system have been removed. HK courts in the 
post-handover era have unequivocally recognized that the legal basis for the 
operation of the HK legal system has changed from the UK system to the PRC 
system. 
For Kelsenians, if, hypothetically, there is currently a valid UK Act 
purporting to validate the HKSAR legal system, then the HK system will be part 
of and subordinate to the UK system, even if HK judges refuse to recognise the 
UK Act as the foundation of the HKSAR legal system. In other words, Kelsen’s 
definition of a legal system consists of a collection of laws related merely by 
“validating purport”.33 This concept of a legal system is idiosyncratic and 
counters our intuition that a legal system will only in fact validate another legal 
system if its validating force is recognized in the latter system.  
                                                 
31 I say “general” because Kelsen used the idea of a change in grundnorm as an exit point to this 
principle. See Kelsen, supra note 6, and accompanying text to infra note 34 below.  
32 E.g. Raz, The Authority of Law, supra note 13, ch. 7; Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, supra 
note 13, chs. 5, 8; HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), at 309-342.  
33 Hart, ibid at 335. 
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 Kelsenians may reply by saying that a shift in grundnorm has occurred in 
HK with the Handover,34 so that the UK system is no longer the validating source 
for HK laws. However, to ascertain whether there has been such a shift in law, 
Kelsenians have to examine whether there is a shift in fact – whether judges no 
longer recognize the UK system as the validating source for HK laws. So at the 
end of the day, Kelsen’s theory is not as “pure” as it propounds to be. Kelsen 
cannot explain away the crucial role played by judicial behaviour in determining 
the validity of norms within a legal system, and has handicapped its general 
theory’s explanatory power by marginalizing the role of judicial behaviour. 
 
2.  Illustration (2): he Congo ase 
 
The Kelsenian Theory of Law fails to capture that norms of the Mainland legal 
system are not in fact valid in HK, if judges in HK refuse to enforce them, even if 
according to Kelsenian logic they should be valid in HK. The recent decisions of 
the HK Court of First Instance35 (CFI) and HK Court of Appeal36 (CA) in the 
Congo case demonstrate this. A New York company, FG Hemisphere, is seeking 
to enforce arbitration awards against the Congo government and several Chinese 
state-owned firms operating in Congo. The CFI and CA recognized two 
contesting schools of thought on sovereign immunity under public international 
law: the absolute doctrine and the restrictive doctrine. The absolute doctrine states 
that domestic courts of a state would not have jurisdiction to try matters where 
another state was named as defendant, unless the defendant state has waived the 
immunity. The restrictive doctrine recognizes an exception to the absolute 
doctrine, being that states do not enjoy immunity from suit in foreign courts when 
they are involved in purely commercial transactions. The question as to which 
doctrine is recognized by customary international law is controversial. 
The Congo government has raised, inter alia, the following arguments: 1. 
The restrictive doctrine has not attained the status of customary international law. 
HK courts have to give due weight to the PRC’s rejection of the restrictive 
doctrine, since HK is now part of the PRC. 2. Even if the court finds that the 
restrictive rather than the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity applies in HK, 
the relevant transactions are not purely of commercial nature, hence the exception 
to the absolute doctrine has not been made out. The Congo government is still 
protected by absolute sovereign immunity. 3. In any case, HK courts do not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate this case, since the case involved “acts of state” such as 
“foreign affairs” – affairs that are stipulated under the BL to be exclusively within 
                                                 
34 For an example of such an argument, see Wacks, supra note 27.  
35 [2009] 1 HKLRD 410. 
36 [2010] 2 HKLRD 66. 
t c
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 the Chinese government’s terrain. “Foreign affairs” are involved because an issue 
of the status of a foreign state is concerned. 
The Congo government’s position on sovereign immunity is shared by the 
Chinese government, whose position was reflected through the Secretary for 
Justice of HK, who intervened in the proceedings to advance submissions on 
sovereign immunity.  
FG Hemisphere, on the other hand, argues that: 1. the restrictive doctrine 
of sovereign immunity forms part of customary international law and is hence 
incorporated into HK law through the common law; 2. the relevant transactions 
are of purely commercial nature, thus the exception to the absolute doctrine has 
been made out. The Congo government therefore does not enjoy immunity from 
suit offered by the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity; 3. no acts of state are 
involved and hence HK courts have jurisdiction to hear the case and enforce the 
arbitration awards.  
The CFI upheld argument no. 2 of the Congo government. Judge Reyes 
found that the relevant transactions were not purely of commercial nature, so even 
if the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity formed part of HK law, the 
transaction would not fall within such an exception to absolute sovereign 
immunity.37 The CFI held in obiter that the court’s provisional view was that the 
restrictive doctrine of immunity applied in HK as part of the common law, and 
that no acts of state were involved.38  
On appeal the CA expressly held that the restrictive doctrine of sovereign 
immunity was recognized as a rule of customary international law and hence 
incorporated into HK law through the common law.39 Overturning the CFI’s 
decision, the CA found that the transactions were of purely commercial nature 
and hence the restrictive doctrine was applicable.40 The CA recognized that the 
PRC government had consistently rejected the restrictive doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, but held that the restrictive doctrine applied in HK notwithstanding the 
PRC’s position, since the BL recognized that the common law continued to apply 
in HK in the absence of intervening legislation.41 It found that no acts of state 
were involved and HK courts had jurisdiction to hear the case.42 The Congo 
government was therefore not immune from suit. 
More analysis on this case will be given in later parts of this article. For 
present purposes, I would only like to point out that Kelsenian monists would 
argue that PRC’s position on sovereign immunity should apply to HK, since the 
                                                 
37 Supra note 35, at paras. 83-96.  
38 Supra note 35, at paras. 32-33, 37-46, 69-72. 
39 Supra note 36, at paras. 45-85. 
40 Supra note 36, at paras. 268-269. 
41 Supra note 36, at paras. 86-123, 260-267. 
42 Supra note 36, at paras. 34-44 
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 PRC Constitution and BL reserved acts of state to the Chinese government. 
According to their logic, following art. 158, BL as well as the PRC Constitution, 
the term “act of state” is subject to interpretation by the Mainland system rather 
than the HK system. The Chinese government’s understanding of “act of state” to 
cover a question of sovereign immunity should therefore be adopted. Yet despite 
this monist logic, such understanding of the term and the principle of absolute 
sovereign immunity are not valid in HK because the CA refused to enforce them. 
Even if the CFA ultimately overturns the CA’s decision and holds that the 
Chinese government’s understanding (or even formal interpretation) of “act of 
state” applies and/or PRC’s position on absolute sovereign immunity does extend 
to HK, it would only have confirmed the point being made here, that judicial 
acceptance in HK is necessary for a Mainland legal norm to be enforceable in 
HK. The Kelsenian approach fails to reflect the decisive role played by judicial 
acceptance in delineating the norms that belong to or are enforceable in a legal 
system, and should be rejected. 
 
V.  THE CASE AGAINST HARTIAN MONISM 
 
A.  Hartian monism 
 
Hartian monists argues that: 
 
(i) Two legal systems are hierarchically ranked within a territory if and only if 
judicial officials in both legal systems accept such hierarchy (Hartian 
Theory of Law); 
(ii) Officials in the Mainland legal system accept that the Mainland system 
ranks higher than the HK system (Empirical premise 1); 
(iii) Officials in the HK legal system also accept such hierarchy (Empirical 
premise 2); 
(iv) Therefore the Mainland system ranks higher than the HK system. 
 
The Hartian monist position is usually intimated by suggestions that the Chinese 
government’s free-standing power to interpret the BL (and HK courts’ acceptance 
thereof) erodes the self-contained nature of the HK legal system.43 Ghai argued, 
after surveying the NPCSC’s use of its power to interpret the BL and HK courts’ 
                                                 
43 See e.g. Y Ghai, “The Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the HKSAR: 
Question of Technique or Politics?”, supra note 4 at 405; JMM Chan, “Judicial Independence: A 
Reply to the Comments of the Mainland Legal Experts on the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the 
Court of Final Appeal”, Y Ghai, “The NPC Interpretation and Its Consequences”, and public 
reactions on “interpretation or amendment”, in HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 61-72, 
199-218, 305-412. 
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 response, that the Chinese system had “triumphed” over the common law system 
due to the political predominance of the Chinese government.44 
I believe the Hartian Theory of Law is plausible, so I will grant (i) for the 
sake of argument here. However, (iii) is false for two reasons: 1. HK courts 
sometimes dispute the Mainland system’s claims of supremacy; 2. HK judges 
have not accepted the NPCSC as the final arbiter of such disputes. 
 
B.  Disputing the Mainland system’s claims  
 
In many instances, the HK judiciary has rejected or is divided towards claims of 
legal supremacy made by the Mainland legal system. Here we see a commonality 
between the legal orders of EU and OCTS. The Treaty of Rome omitted to 
stipulate the relationship between the legal system of the European Community 
and national legal systems. Similarly, the BL text is ambiguous as to the 
relationship between the Mainland system and its HK counterpart.45 These 
silences or ambiguities have sowed the seeds in each case for the rise of multiple 
inconsistent rules of recognition on four major issues that besiege the monist 
question of hierarchy:46 1. whether the foundation of the operation of EU 
(Mainland) law in member states (HK) lies in the EU (Mainland) legal system or 
national constitutions or law (BL); 2. whether the norms of the EU (Mainland) 
legal system prevail over norms of the member states’ constitutions (BL) in case 
of conflict; 3. whether national courts (CFA) are (is) the final arbiter of 
constitutionality; 4. whether EU institutions (NPCSC) or national courts (CFA) 
possess(es) kompetenz-kompetenz. 
In the EU, one rule pronounced by the ECJ states that the basis of 
supremacy of EU law in member states is the autonomous status of the EU legal 
order, that EU law takes precedence over all national law including national 
constitutions, and the ECJ can define the limits of its own power.47 The contrary 
rule is expounded by certain national courts. For example, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG) and the French courts have both stated that the 
                                                 
44 Y Ghai, “The Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the HKSAR: Question of 
Technique or Politics?”, supra note 4 at 405. 
45 See supra Section III. 
46 Craig and De Burca suggested a similar list of questions for analysing the issue of the 
supremacy of EU law. P Craig and G De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th edn. 
(Oxford: Oxford University press, 2008) 354.  
47 E.g. Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transporten Expedite Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. 
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL 
[1964] ECR 585; Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
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 basis for the precedence of EU law lies in their own constitutions.48 The BVerfG 
maintains that norms of fundamental rights guaranteed by the German 
constitution remain superior to EU law, and that it remains the final arbiter of 
constitutionality.49 UK courts have been more equivocal but have generally 
accepted that the foundation for the precedence of EU law is primarily the 
European Communities Act 1972, and that the UK Parliament retains the ultimate 
power to explicitly repeal this Act.50 The BVerfG have expressly asserted that 
they retain the ultimate competence to police the limits of the authority of EU 
institutions.51  
Likewise, the population in HK has faced competing answers regarding 
the above questions. On the questions of whether applicable Mainland law 
prevails over the BL, and whether HK courts are the final arbiter of 
constitutionality in HK: one rule expounded by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling states that 
the CFA is the final arbiter of constitutionality and can declare invalid any 
applicable NPC act that contravenes the BL.52 At issue in Ng Ka Ling was 
whether children born of permanent residents of HK (such children qualify as 
permanent residents with the right of abode in HK under art. 24(2)(3), BL) needed 
to obtain approval from the Mainland authorities before entering HK from the 
Mainland (such approval requirements stated in art. 22(4) to apply to all 
                                                 
48 For German decisions see e.g. Internationale Handelsgesellschalft mbH v. Einfuhr- und 
Vorratstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (Solange I); Re Wunsche 
Handelsgesselschaft [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (Solange II); the BVerfG’s recent decision on the 
Treaty of Lisbon (signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009): 
Decision of 30 June 2009, Cases 2 BvE 2/08 et. al. (English translation published by the Court 
available at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ 
en/decisions/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>). See commentary in R Bieber, “An Association 
of Sovereign States” (2009) 5 EuConst 391 and M Kumm, “Who is the Final Arbiter of 
Constitutionality in Europe?” (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 351. For French decisions: 
Decision of Conseil d’Etat on 20 October 1989 in Raoul Georges Nicolo [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 173; 
Decision of Cour de Cassation on 24 May 1975 in Administration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes 
Jacques Vabre’ et Sarl Weigel et Cie [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336, both referred to in Craig and De 
Burca, supra note 45 at 354-357; see also P Oliver, “The French Constitution and the Treaty of 
Maastricht” (1994) 43 I.C.L.Q. 1.  
49 Solange I decision, ibid. Nor has this position on retaining the final say on constitutionality been 
retreated from in Solange II, although there the court revised the Solange formula such that an 
incompatibility between EU law and German law on fundamental rights is most likely to be 
exceptional. Confirmed by the court’s recent Decision on the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 48.  
50 In Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) [1990] UKHL 13, Lord Bridge 
referred to both the ECA 1972 and the ECJ’s reasoning in according precedence to EU law (para 
4). In Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 however, the court emphasized that 
such precedence is based exclusively on domestic acceptance (paras. 60-69). 
51 Brunner v. The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, aff’d in recent Decision on 
Lisbon Treaty, supra note 48. See M Zuleeg, “The European Constitution under Constitutional 
Constraints: the German Scenario” (1997) 22(1) European Law Review 19. 
52 Supra note 28 at 337-339.  
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 Mainlanders who wished to enter HK). One issue that the CFA had to deal with 
was whether the Immigration (Amendment) (No. 3) Ordinance of HK, which 
implemented certain aspects of art. 22(4), BL, was passed by a legislative body – 
the Provisional Legislative Council – that was validly established. The 
Provisional Legislative Council was set up by a Preparatory Committee that was 
established by an NPC decision made on the same day as when the NPC 
promulgated the BL. The CFA held that it had the power to declare invalid any 
applicable NPC acts that contravened the BL. Such bold statement had little 
impact on the substantive ruling of the case, since on the facts the CFA did not 
find the relevant NPC decision establishing the Preparatory Committee 
inconsistent with the BL.53   
The contrary rule was articulated by the CA in Ma Wai Kwan,54 as well as 
the Chinese government in its criticisms of the CFA’s bold position in Ng Ka 
Ling.55 This contrary rule affirms that the NPC’s supremacy cannot be challenged 
by any organ. HK courts do not have jurisdiction to declare invalid any NPC or 
NPCSC act. A year after the Ng Ka Ling decision, the question of whether a 
national law made applicable in HK through the BL, or a conflicting BL 
provision, prevails, was raised in Ng Kung Siu.56 This time, unlike the CFA in Ng 
Ka Ling, the court averted from deciding whether HK courts could invalidate any 
applicable national law that contravened the BL, by disposing of the case on 
another ground.57 Thus while the CFA in Ng Ka Ling clearly asserted the 
supremacy of the BL over contravening NPC acts and the CFA’s power to 
invalidate such contravening acts, the CFA in Ng Kung Siu declined to declare its 
stance. As far as the law of HK is concerned, the CFA’s position in Ng Ka Ling 
has not been overridden, but it is not clear if such stance will be followed in light 
of the Chinese government’s criticisms of such position. 
In addition, there are multiple rules pointing to different foundations for 
recognising the operation of the Mainland legal system in HK. One rule espoused 
by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling states that the constitution of HK – the BL – 
constitutes the only basis for the court’s recognition of the NPCSC’s power of 
interpreting the BL.58 The contrary rule declared by the Chinese authorities and 
                                                 
53 Supra note 28 at 355, 357. 
54 HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & Others [1997] HKLRD 761, paras. 18-20 
55 Supra note 29. Chinese officials were reported to have criticized the CFA’s position as 
unconstitutional and requested its rectification. For more discussion see AHY Chen, 
“Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong” (2006) 15 Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal 627 at 636. 
56 HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu (FACC/1999) [2000] 1 HKC 117.  
57 The CFA found that there was no conflict between BL and the relevant provisions of the 
national law in question, so there was no need for the court to consider which prevailed in case of 
conflict. Ibid, paras. 60-67. 
58 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 28 at 341-345. 
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 the CFA on other occasions states that the BL as well as the PRC Constitution 
form the HK courts’ basis for accepting the NPCSC’s interpretative power.59 HK 
courts’ basis for recognising the effect of the Mainland legal system in HK is 
equivocal.  
The question of whether organs of the Mainland legal system or HK courts 
possess kompetenz-kompetenz arises in various contexts. For instance, there are 
contrary rules on whether the NPCSC has the power to delineate the limits of its 
own power to interpret the BL under the judicial reference scheme in art. 158(3), 
BL. One rule explained by the CFA in Ng Ka Ling asserts that the CFA “alone” 
had the authority to delineate the limits of the NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL 
under the judicial reference scheme.60 What constituted an excluded affair (the 
NPCSC’s turf), whether interpretation of such provision was needed to decide a 
case, and hence, whether a preliminary ruling from the NPCSC had to be sought, 
were to be decided by the CFA exclusively. In that case, the CFA invented a 
“predominant provision” test to determine whether there was a need to seek a 
preliminary ruling from the NPCSC. The CFA held that it would only need to 
seek a preliminary ruling if the predominant article to be interpreted was an 
excluded provision.61 Applying this test, the CFA found that there was no need to 
seek a preliminary ruling in that case, because the “predominant” article to be 
interpreted was art. 24(2)(3), BL, a provision that fell within HKSAR’s 
autonomy; the “excluded provision”, art. 22(4), BL, was only arguably relevant to 
the interpretation of the predominant article.62 Interpreting these provisions on its 
own, the CFA found that children of HK permanent residents were entitled to the 
right of abode in HK and did not need to obtain approval from the Chinese 
authorities before entering HK from the Mainland.63    
The NPCSC implicated a contrary rule when it issued an interpretation 
that overrode the CFA’s substantive decision. In response to the social 
implications of the CFA’s decision in Ng Ka Ling – that a large number of 
Mainland children would be at once entitled to the right of abode in HK thus 
putting grave pressure on the SAR government’s financial resources – the Chief 
Executive of HK requested the NPCSC to issue a reinterpretation of arts. 22(4) 
                                                 
59 The Interpretation by the NPCSC of articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the HKSAR 
of the PRC adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress at its 
Tenth Session on 26 June 1999 [hereinafter: “Ng Ka Ling Interpretation”], at para. 1; Lau Kong 
Yung and 16 others v. Director of Immigration [1999] 3 HKLRD 778 at 797-800; The Director of 
Immigration v. Master Chong Fung Yuen [2001] 2 HKLRD 533 at section 6.2.  
60 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 28 at 342. 
61 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 28 at 341-345. 
62 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 28 at 341-345.  
63 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 28 at 341-345.  
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 and 24(2)(3), BL.64 By way of background, the legal basis for the Chief 
Executive’s request for reinterpretation was heavily doubted. The HK judiciary is 
the only institution that was specifically empowered and obligated by the BL to 
seek interpretations from the NPCSC. The BL does not expressly confer on the 
Chief Executive the power to seek an interpretation from the NPCSC. The Chief 
Executive relied on its general powers of implementing law in HK to seek the 
interpretation.65  
The NPCSC’s reinterpretation, issued in response to the Chief Executive’s 
request, reversed the CFA’s ruling. The substantive decision of the NPCSC’s 
interpretation was that Mainland children born of HK permanent residents would 
still have to obtain approval from Mainland authorities before entering HK from 
the Mainland.66 The NPCSC also remarked that the conditions for seeking judicial 
reference were met, hinting that the predominant provision test was wrong and the 
CFA should have sought a preliminary ruling.67 Although the NPCSC did not 
explicitly state that it possessed powers to decide whether its powers of 
interpreting the BL kicked in under the preliminary ruling system, still the 
implication of it hinting that the CFA was wrong in not seeking a preliminary 
ruling was that the NPCSC, rather than the CFA, was the final decision-maker as 
to whether judicial reference should be sought.   
Subsequently, the CFA in Lau Kong Yung applied the substantive decision 
of the reinterpretation by the NPCSC.68 At this point one may wonder if the 
CFA’s acceptance of such reinterpretation amounted to its acceptance of the 
NPCSC’s implication that the NPCSC possessed the competence to define the 
limits of its own interpretative powers under the judicial reference system. I argue 
that the CFA’s acceptance of the NPCSC interpretation should not be read in this 
way, for the following reasons.  
As a matter of theoretical clarity, one must distinguish the two tracks 
under art. 158, BL through which the NPCSC can interpret the BL. The first track 
is the NPCSC’s power to issue an interpretation of the BL upon reference from 
HK courts under art. 158(3). The second track is the NPCSC’s plenary powers of 
issuing an interpretation of the BL without reference from HK courts under art. 
158(1). The NPCSC’s reinterpretation in the aftermath of Ng Ka Ling was an 
exercise of its plenary interpretative powers in the second track rather than its 
                                                 
64 See The Chief Executive’s Report to the State Council Concerning the Right of Abode, 
submitted to the State Council of the PRC on 20 May 1999, and the Ng Ka Ling Interpretation, 
supra note 59, both reproduced in HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 474-480. 
65 The Chief Executive relied on art. 48(2), BL (on his power to implement laws in HK) and art. 
43, BL (stipulating that he shall be the head of the HK government and accountable to the Central 
People’s Government and HKSAR). 
66 The Ng Ka Ling Interpretation, supra note 59 para. 2. 
67 The Ng Ka Ling Interpretation, supra note 59 para. 1. 
68 Lau Kong Yung, supra note 59. 
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 interpretative powers under the judicial reference scheme in the first track. The 
CFA’s acceptance of this reinterpretation clearly indicated its acceptance of the 
plenary interpretative powers of the NPCSC. (Such acceptance had, of course, for 
all practical purposes, significant implications on the issue of hierarchy between 
the two legal systems, as will be explained in section V.B.). However, the CFA 
has never indicated that it accepts the NPCSC’s implicated claim of kompetenz-
kompetenz under the judicial reference scheme.  
Indeed, on various occasions after Ng Ka Ling, HK courts have continued 
to decide for themselves (sometimes fashioning legal tests for these purposes) 
whether an issue falls within the NPCSC’s sphere of excluded affairs for the 
purposes of determining whether a preliminary ruling had to be requested.69 
Courts in HK thus seemed to have rejected the Mainland system’s claim of 
kompetenz-kompetenz under the judicial reference scheme.  
This debate over kompetenz-kompetenz is now reoccurring in the Congo 
case. In a recent procedural hearing, the Congo government requested the CFA to 
consider asking the NPCSC to interpret provisions in the BL that limit HK court’s 
jurisdiction over “acts of state”.70 Recall that under art. 158(3), BL, the CFA has 
to seek a preliminary ruling from the NPCSC if the CFA needs to interpret 
provisions concerning excluded affairs such as “acts of state” in order to 
adjudicate a case. What is possibly far-reaching about the Congo government’s 
request for seeking an interpretation from the NPCSC is this. If, in line with the 
Congo government’s position, the CFA ultimately does seek and accept the 
NPCSC’s interpretation of what an “act of state” constitutes and includes, the 
CFA would effectively be letting the NPCSC decide to a large extent when the 
NPCSC’s own powers to interpret the BL under the judicial reference scheme are 
triggered. The NPCSC would then to a large degree have become the judge of the 
limits of its own competence under art. 158(3), BL. The CFA would then no 
longer be able to insist, as the CFA in Ng Ka Ling did, that it “alone” has the 
power to decide whether a preliminary ruling should be sought. Whether this 
would turn out to be the case will remain a favourite subject of speculation in 
China and HK until the CFA decides later this year if it will seek its first judicial 
reference from the NPCSC since the Handover.  
                                                 
69 E.g. Chong Fung Yuen, supra note 59 at section 7.4. The CFA held that the court should 
examine the “character” of the provision to decide whether it was an excluded provision. See also 
the Congo Case, (CFI), supra note 35 at paras. 45-46, 72-73; The Congo Case (CA), supra note 36 
at paras. 34-44. Although, it must be noted that the CFA in Lau Kong Yung (at 800-F) and Chong 
Fung Yuen (at section 7.5) indicated that the “predominant provision” test might have to be 
revisited in future if the appropriate case arose. 
70 In a procedural hearing on 30 June 2010, the Congo government asked the CFA to consider 
seeking an NPCSC interpretation on arts 8, 13 and 19, BL. See Press Release issued by the HK 
Judiciary on 20 July 2010, available at <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201007/20/ 
P201007200253.htm> (last accessed on 18 August 2010). 
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 C.  No final arbiter 
 
The Hartian monist can concede the above but still insist that the Mainland 
system ranks higher because: 
 
(iii)(a) Officials in the HK legal system accept the free-standing nature of the 
NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL. 
(iii)(b) Thus they accept the NPCSC as final arbiter of disputes between the two 
legal systems. 
(iii)(c) Therefore they accept that the Mainland system ranks higher than the HK 
system. 
 
This is a powerful claim. The factual premise in (iii)(a) is not disputed. It has been 
accepted by HK courts in Lau Kong Yung71 and other cases that the NPCSC’s 
power to interpret the BL can be exercised in a free-standing manner. This 
highlights two important differences between the EU legal order and the 
Mainland-HK legal order that make the latter look much more monist than the 
former. First, whereas in the former, the final power of interpreting national 
constitutions and other national law resides with member states’ organs, in the 
latter, the final power of interpreting the BL resides with an institution of the 
Mainland legal system. Secondly, whereas in the EU legal order the ECJ could 
only make preliminary rulings on EU law pursuant to national courts’ requests, in 
the Mainland-HK legal order, the NPCSC could issue an interpretation of the BL 
on its own initiative, in the absence of reference from institutions of the HK legal 
system.   
I would like to challenge the link from (iii)(a) to (iii)(b), which has largely 
been assumed. It is widely asserted without explanation that the NPCSC, with 
free-standing powers of interpreting the BL, is the “arbiter” of constitutional 
disputes between the two legal systems.72 Moreover, Ghai offered no argument as 
                                                 
71 The Ng Ka Ling Interpretation was made without judicial reference. One of the subject articles 
for interpretation (art. 24(2)(3), BL) was a provision falling within HK’s autonomy. The CFA in 
Lau Kong Yung, supra note 59, through accepting the Interpretation, accepts both free-standing 
aspects of the NPCSC’s interpretative power. The court’s acceptance of the free-standing nature of 
the NPCSC’s interpretative power is confirmed in later cases, see e.g. Chong Fung Yuen, supra 
note 59 at section 6.2. 
72 For example, Chen contrasted federalism with OCTS by pointing out, inter alia, that whereas 
jurisdictional conflicts in the former are resolved by an independent court, in the latter, they are 
resolved by the NPCSC acting in consultation with the BL Committee. Albert HY Chen, “The 
Theory, Constitution and Practice of Autonomy: The Case of Hong Kong” in Jorge Oliveira and 
Paulo Cardinal, eds., One Country, Two Systems, Three Legal Orders – Perspectives of Evolution 
(Springer, 2009), at 761. Similar assertions on the NPCSC being “arbiter” have been made in the 
context of lamenting the lack of impartial arbiter on jurisdictional disputes between the two 
systems. 
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 to why HK’s courts’ acceptance of NPCSC’s free-standing power to interpret the 
BL leads to a victory of the Chinese system over the common law system.73 
However, I believe a prima facie convincing case can be made for the link as 
follows. 
The argument goes, that the BL is the primary document that regulates the 
relationship between the Mainland and HK legal systems. The BL might have 
been ambiguous as to who the arbiter of disputes between the legal systems is, yet 
13 years down the road, we are now clear: NPCSC is it. In accepting the 
NPCSC’s free-standing power to interpret the document that sets out the 
relationship between the two legal systems, the CFA has effectively accepted the 
NPCSC’s power to resolve many disputes regarding the relationship between the 
two legal systems. For example, an applicable NPC act alleged to be inconsistent 
with the BL can, through an NPCSC’s reinterpretation of the BL, be rendered thus 
consistent. A determination by the NPCSC of the limits of its own competence 
can be made under the façade of interpreting certain BL provisions (e.g. what 
constitutes “acts of state”).  
I do not dispute that judicial acceptance of the NPCSC’s free-standing 
power to interpret the BL can have far-reaching implications for the resolution of 
disputes between the two systems. I only wish to make the modest point that in 
light of the complexities of the BL and the subtle resistance displayed in the 
judicial behaviour in HK, it is not clear that HK courts have accepted the NPCSC 
as final arbiter of all disputes between the legal systems.  
The BL is an ambitious, multifaceted document which, while retaining the 
Chinese government’s supervisory role over HK, stipulates considerable limits on 
that role. Although the BL did not expressly impose restrictions on the substantive 
content of an interpretation issued by the NPCSC, still there are content 
restrictions on the amendment of the BL. Similar to the doctrine of “basic 
structure” under art. 79(3) of the German Basic Law, which was adopted by 
courts in some South Asian jurisdictions,74 art. 159(4), BL provides that any 
amendment of the BL cannot contravene the PRC’s “basic policies” towards 
HK,75 which include the guarantee of a high degree of autonomy to HK. A special 
procedure for amending the BL is stipulated in art. 159, BL. The BL of HK, 
together with the Basic Law of Macau, are the only two laws in the PRC which 
provide for its own amendment procedures and which contain content restrictions 
                                                 
73 Y Ghai, “The Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the HKSAR: Question of 
Technique or Politics?”, supra note 4 at 405. 
74 Including India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. 
75 Elaborated in the JD (cl. 3 and Annex I) and stipulated to remain unchanged for 50 years (cl. 
3(12), JD); stated to be unamendable in the BL (art. 159(4), BL). 
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 on the NPC’s plenary powers to amend laws.76 The chemistry of the NPCSC’s 
free-standing power to interpret the BL interacting with these provisions limiting 
the Chinese government’s role in HK has yet to be fully tested. 
So far only one interpretation of the BL issued by the NPCSC – the 
interpretation in relation to Ng Ka Ling issued in 1999 – has been “put to test” in 
HK courts. The NPCSC has issued two other interpretations of the BL (one in 
2004 and the other in 2005),77 but there has not been any occasion in which HK 
courts had to decide whether to accept these interpretations or not. The CFA in Ng 
Ka Ling found that art. 24(2)(3), BL should not be read subject to art. 22(4), BL. 
The NPCSC, overriding the CFA’s decision, interpreted art. 24(2)(3), BL to be 
subject to art. 22(4), BL. Arguably, the substantive content of this Interpretation 
by the NPCSC could reasonably be borne by the text of the BL. The CFA’s 
acceptance of this Interpretation therefore could not reveal whether the CFA 
recognises any restrictions on the substantive content of an NPCSC interpretation. 
Nor has the CFA ever indicated whether there are any substantive restrictions on 
the content of an interpretation issued by the NPCSC. Would the CFA accept an 
interpretation by the NPCSC, the substantive content of which clearly contravenes 
the non-amendable “basic policies” of the PRC towards HK? Would the CFA 
accept an interpretation with substantive content that contravenes the explicit 
wording of the BL such that no consistent reading of the two can be sustained – so 
that to give effect to the interpretation would be to allow a back-door amendment 
of the BL (rendering art. 159, BL nugatory)? HK courts have not been tested on 
these questions. Their possible stance may be ascertained by examining more 
closely the oft-overlooked subtle difference that the CFA drew in its 
“Clarification”. 
As explained above, the CFA in Ng Ka Ling asserted the jurisdiction to 
review and declare invalid any applicable NPC act that contravened the BL. This 
ambitious position triggered violent criticisms from the Chinese government and 
some Chinese scholars.78 The HK government, upon pressure from the Chinese 
government, unprecedentedly requested a “Clarification” from the CFA on this 
                                                 
76 Ghai, “Litigating the Basic Law: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and Procedure” in HK’s 
Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 48. 
77 The 2004 Interpretation was made on the NPCSC’s own initiative, in relation to provisions on 
constitutional reform in HK. The 2005 Interpretation was made on the HK Chief Executive’s 
request, in relation to the term of office of the Chief Executive. The Interpretation by the NPCSC 
of art. 7 of Annex I and article III of Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, adopted by the Standing Committee of 
the Tenth National People’s Congress at its Eighth Session on 6 April 2004; the Interpretation of 
para. 2, art. 53 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China, adopted at the 15th Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National 
People’s Congress on 27 April 2005. 
78 See supra note 29. 
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 point of jurisdiction.79 The CFA restated its position in more palatable terms, 
explaining that it 1. accepted the NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL; and 2. could 
not question any NPC act that was consistent with the BL.80 The subtle difference 
drawn by the CFA between the power to interpret the BL and the power to police 
constitutionality in HK was rarely discussed. While giving up the former power, 
the CFA tacitly refused to relinquish the latter.  
The drawing of this difference is crucial – though its implication is 
unclear. It may mean that:  
 
(A) the CFA considers itself qualified to review applicable NPC acts for 
compatibility with the BL, but if the NPCSC issues an interpretation of the 
BL that dissolves any incompatibility, the CFA is bound by it.81 Under this 
reading, the CFA is no longer the final arbiter of constitutionality in HK.  
 
However, it may also mean that:  
 
(B) the CFA’s acceptance of the NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL is not 
unconditional, but subject to qualifications on the substantive content of 
the interpretation. If the NPCSC’s interpretation contravenes the 
unalterable core of the BL, or cannot be read consistently with the BL 
without amending the BL, then the CFA may enforce the “Schmittian” 
exception to declare the NPCSC decision invalid.82 The German court’s 
Solange formula may be relevant here. The BVerfG has maintained that 
“so long as” the ECJ ensured effective protection of fundamental rights 
similar to that required under the German Constitution, the BVerfG would 
not exercise its jurisdiction to review EC law for compatibility with 
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.83 The CFA’s statement 
of clarification could suggest that “so long as” an applicable NPC or 
NPCSC act is consistent with the BL, the CFA would not exercise its 
                                                 
79 The HK government’s move was heavily criticized by parts of the HK legal profession and 
academia. See, JMM Chan, “What the Court of Final Appeal Has Not Clarified in Its 
Clarification: Jurisdiction and Amicus Intervention” in HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 
at 171-178 and criticisms documented in HK’s Constitutional Debates, supra note 4 at 249-252, 
255-256.  
80 Ng Ka Ling and Others v. Director of Immigration (No. 2) [1999] 1 HKLRD 577 [hereinafter: 
“Clarification”), at 578. 
81 AHY Chen, “The Court of Final Appeal’s Ruling in the ‘Illegal Migrant’ Children Case: 
Congressional Supremacy and Judicial Review” in HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 
84. 
82 Maduro applied Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty to analyse the situation of competing legal 
sovereigns in Europe, supra note 10 at 505, 522. 
83 Solange II decision, supra note 48. 
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 jurisdiction to declare the act invalid. On this reading of the Clarification, 
the CFA preserves its previously proclaimed role to guard off 
unconstitutional NPC acts.   
 
Either reading (A or B) of the Clarification is possible. The Clarification managed 
to resolve the crisis84 precisely because of its ambiguity. The point of 
emphasizing the CFA’s obscure position displayed in the Clarification is to 
highlight that it is far from clear that HK courts have relinquished their role as 
final arbiters of constitutionality in HK and accepted the NPCSC as the judge to 
all disputes between the two legal systems. Although it was more than a decade 
ago when the CFA announced its role to police the constitutionality of applicable 
Mainland norms in Ng Ka Ling, still, HK courts have not retreated from, nor cast 
doubt upon, this position. To be fair though, the issue of whether HK courts could 
invalidate contravening NPC or NPCSC acts has not been seriously considered in 
HK courts since Ng Ka Ling. It was raised in Ng Kung Siu but the CFA cleverly 
avoided the need to deal with this question.85  
Now, 11 years on from Ng Ka Ling, the Congo case presents the CFA with 
a possible opportunity to decide whether it would accept an NPCSC interpretation 
with substantive content that infringes the unalterable core of the BL.86 The 
following are some possible outcomes to the case:  
 
(A) The CFA may, like the CFI, choose not to seek judicial reference and 
make a decision that favours Congo and China’s position. For instance, it 
may find that the relevant transactions are of purely commercial nature, so 
the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity is inapplicable in any case. 
In this way the CFA could preserve its kompetenz-kompetenz without 
upsetting the Chinese government. It is unclear whether the pragmatic 
consideration of preserving judicial autonomy without triggering 
                                                 
84 In response to the Clarification, a spokesman for the Legislative Affairs Commission of the 
NPCSC stated that the clarification was necessary, and the Vice-Premier Qian Qichen also hinted 
that the constitutional crisis had ended. Speech of the Spokesman for the NPCSC, reproduced in 
HK’s Constitutional Debate, supra note 4 at 246. See also “Qian adds to easing of abode dispute”, 
South China Morning Post (1 March 1999).  
85 See supra note 57. 
86 The case attracted much attention and was considered the litmus test to HK’s high degree of 
autonomy. See e.g. M Lee, “Hong Kong, China clash in landmark court case on sovereign 
immunity” The Canadian Press (23 July 2010), available at 
<http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/world/breakingnews/ hong-kong-china-clash-in-landmark-
court-case-on-sovereign-immunity-99091289.html> (last accessed 18 August 2010). TH Shih, 
“Top court may seek review of Basic Law: Independence of HK’s judicial system faces test” 
South China Morning Post (HK, 20 July 2010). 
22
Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 6 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol6/iss1/art1
DOI: 10.2202/1932-0205.1318
 constitutional crisis was a factor motivating the CFI’s judgment, but in 
hindsight the CFI’s position seemed extremely tactful politically. Or,  
(B) The CFA may, like the CA, choose not to seek a judicial reference and 
make a decision against Congo and China’s position. For instance, it may 
find that the restrictive doctrine applies in HK and the relevant 
transactions are of purely commercial nature. In such a case the NPCSC 
will likely issue a reinterpretation to overrule the CFA’s decision. Or, 
(C) The CFA may, in response to the Congo government’s request, seek an 
interpretation from the NPCSC on the meaning of “act of state” in the BL, 
in order to determine whether the CFA has jurisdiction to hear the case.  
 
In both scenarios B and C, the NPCSC would very likely interpret “foreign 
affairs” and “acts of state” in an over-expansive way so that the Congo case is 
covered. So the NPCSC might, in line with the Congo government’s submissions, 
find that an act of state is involved whenever a claim of sovereign immunity is 
involved. It is probable that such expansive interpretation will be issued because 
the Chinese government has vested interests in protecting the Congo 
government’s position in this case. Chinese state-owned firms are also named as 
defendants in this case. The court’s decision will affect the financial position of 
these state-owned firms, and may also affect the Chinese government’s 
relationship with the Congo government. 
If the CFA accepts an expansive interpretation by the NPCSC, it would 
have surrendered a large part of its competence to delimit when the NPCSC’s 
interpretative powers are triggered under the judicial reference scheme. More 
importantly, it would have ceded HK courts’ jurisdiction to hear matters which 
were previously considered by the CFI and CA as falling within HK’s autonomy. 
The CFA would have signified that it accepted no content restrictions on the 
NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL. That would be a major step towards 
accepting the NPCSC as the arbiter of conflicts between the two legal systems. 
However, applying the analysis in the last few paragraphs, it is certainly 
possible and consistent with the CFA’s historical position for the CFA to refuse to 
accept an over-expansive interpretation of the Chinese government’s sphere of 
influence, for the reason that such interpretation would breach a non-amendable 
core of the BL – the guarantee of a high degree of autonomy, including judicial 
autonomy, to HK. Indeed, if HK courts do not have jurisdiction whenever a claim 
of sovereign immunity is involved, the adjudicative sphere of HK courts will be 
seriously curbed. The CA and CFI of the case have both rejected the Congo 
government’s wide understanding of “foreign affairs” and “acts of state”.87 The 
CA held that the act of state doctrine only precluded courts from challenging the 
                                                 
87 See CFI and CA’s reasoning for rejecting such a wide reading of  “foreign affair” and “act of 
state”, Congo Case (CFI), supra note 35 at paras. 45-46, 72, (CA), supra note 36 at paras. 34-44.  
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 validity of decisions (“acts”) made by foreign states or the PRC government in the 
exercise of its sovereign power (“of state”).88 Both courts found that no such act 
of state was being questioned in the case, which fell within the four corners of the 
courts’ jurisdiction. If the CFA in the Congo case ultimately imposed content 
restrictions on the NPCSC’s power to interpret the BL and refused to give effect 
to an over-expansive interpretation by the NPCSC for contravening the core of the 
BL, it would have upheld its role as guardian of constitutionality in HK. This 
would likely come at the cost of resurrecting the constitutional deadlock between 
the Chinese government and the CFA in the aftermath of Ng Ka Ling.   
To conclude this section, in light of the complexities of the BL and the 
equivocal behaviour of HK courts, it is too crude to conclude that HK courts have, 
once-and-for-all, accepted the NPCSC as final arbiter of all disputes between the 
legal systems. The issue may become clearer when HK courts are confronted 
squarely with decisions on whether to accept NPCSC interpretations, the 
substantive content of which plainly breaches the PRC’s basic policies towards 
HK or which clearly constitutes a de facto amendment of the BL. 
 
D.  Institutional dialogue 
 
The above analysis of institutional behaviour in the two legal systems suggests 
that actors in the Mainland legal system (i.e. the NPCSC and the Central 
Authorities), and those in its HK counterpart (i.e. HK courts), seem to have been 
engaging in institutional dialogues on various issues of hierarchy.89 The dialogue 
metaphor is apt here since HK courts and the Chinese government each assert 
their positions on questions of hierarchy and respond to each other’s stance. 
Neither party has the legal power to trump the other’s claims of legal supremacy. 
These dialogues have not yielded any clear conclusion on which legal system 
ranks higher. The HK judiciary sometimes disputes the Mainland system’s stance, 
is at times divided as to whether to harmonise with the Mainland system’s 
position, and is at other times equivocal as to whether they accept the Mainland 
system’s claims of supremacy. Dialogues may seem to be closed when no 
controversial question of hierarchy is raised, but they may be reopened as soon as 
unresolved questions of hierarchy resurge.  
 
 
                                                 
88 Congo case, supra note 36 at paras. 37-44, 248. 
89 I thank Scott Veitch for suggesting the dialogue metaphor.  
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 VI.  AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION 
 
A.  Dualism 
 
HK courts’ attitude towards the question of hierarchy has been, at best, 
inconclusive. This equivocal judicial attitude does not support a monistic 
conception of the Mainland-HK legal order. A possible alternative theory for 
explaining the legal order may be dualism. On a superficial reading of the BL, it 
seems that dualism is what OCTS is getting at: the NPCSC will have the final say 
on excluded affairs by retaining the power to interpret excluded provisions of the 
BL, while HK courts will have the final say on matters within HK’s autonomy 
through its powers to interpret BL provisions within HK’s autonomy.  
However, two assumptions behind dualism are unfulfilled in the OCTS 
model. Firstly, dualism assumes that the foundation of recognising the outside 
legal order rests with the local legal order. This goes against the Mainland legal 
system’s perspective, from which the basis for recognising PRC law in HK is the 
PRC constitution rather than the BL. A similar problem exists with using the 
dualist perspective to analyse the legal order of the EU. 90 Dualism goes against 
the EU legal system’s viewpoint, from which the foundation for recognizing EU 
law in member states lies in the EU order’s autonomous nature and not in national 
law.  
Secondly, dualism assumes that the two legal orders have complete 
control over their respective subject matters. Yet, the HK and Chinese systems do 
not possess absolute power in the delineated subject matters, nor are their 
respective powers limited to those subject areas. The NPCSC’s power to interpret 
excluded provisions is diluted by the power of lower courts in HK to make 
interpretations on those provisions as well,91 while HK courts’ power to interpret 
provisions within HK’s autonomy is reduced by the NPCSC’s retention of the 
final power to interpret all BL provisions.92 Since certain assumptions of dualism 
are unfulfilled in the relationship between the legal systems of Mainland China 
and HK, dualism is not a suitable model for analysing such relationship. 
 
                                                 
90 For the inability of dualism to explain the EU legal order, see e.g. La Torre, supra note 7 at 192-
193. 
91 Art. 158(3), BL. 
92 Arts. 158(1) and (2), BL. 
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 B.  Pluralism 
 
This article presents legal pluralism as a possible alternative theoretical 
framework. Applying the legal pluralist framework developed from the EU 
context, the HK and Chinese legal systems are unranked. This account best 
explains the competing claims of legal supremacy made by the NPCSC and HK 
courts respectively, and the equivocal judicial behaviour in HK.93 Each of the two 
inconsistent claims to supremacy makes sense within their own logic. Both can be 
correct, it is a matter of perspective. 
Legal pluralism tells us to stop asking the monist question of which legal 
system ranks higher, since in a situation of parallel legal systems there is no 
single, once-and-for-all answer to the question.94 The contest between the 
systems will not be determined by legal solution or objective hierarchy, but by 
how a myriad of political factors play out on a case-by-case basis. Examples of 
such political factors include the relative political strength of the competing 
protagonists, defined as their ability to make others submit to their will; and their 
weighing of the pros and cons of insisting on their will in each instance. 
This perspective fits comfortably with the dialogic relationship between 
the Mainland-HK systems. Protagonists of the Mainland legal system and HK 
legal system constantly test the bottom line of each other in their dialogues on 
hierarchy issues, and would dare to assert supremacy on such issues whenever the 
political stakes are favourable. There is no higher legal authority to adjudicate the 
institutional debate. Victory is determined by the shifting loyalties of officials in 
each particular instance, in turn determined by various political factors.95  
On the issue of whether HK courts can invalidate applicable NPC acts that 
contravene the BL, the CFA in Ng Ka Ling entertained the legally controversial 
request for a “clarification” and delivered its position in a milder tone, for fear 
that the NPCSC would outright reject a less ambiguous stance. The NPCSC was 
contented96 with an obscure reply from the CFA whereby the court tacitly 
preserved the superiority of BL norms over conflicting NPC acts and the court’s 
role to police the constitutionality of NPC acts; such placation grew out of worries 
that any further insistence on the clarification of the hierarchy question would 
trigger the CFA’s refusal to cooperate. Both sides demonstrated reluctance to 
                                                 
93 Barents made a similar argument for pluralism in the EU context. Barents, supra note 5 at 443-
444. 
94 Kumm, supra note 48 at 384-386. 
95 Tai also emphasized the importance of political considerations to the constitutional positioning 
of various parties under OCTS. B Tai, “Chapter 1 of HK’s New Constitution” in MK Chan and 
AY So. eds., Crisis and Transformation in China’s Hong Kong (HK: HK University Press, 2002) 
189-219, esp. at 211. B Tai, “Basic Law, Basic Politics” (2007) 37 HKLJ 503. 
96 See supra note 84.  
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 surrender supremacy, yet both dared only to push this far in the dialogue as they 
began to smell smoke. 
Regarding the issue of who the arbiter of disputes between the two legal 
systems is, the CFA in Lau Kong Yung accepted the NPCSC’s free-standing 
power of interpreting the BL, thus sanctioning, to some extent, the NPCSC’s role 
as arbiter. The CFA was faced with either accepting or rejecting the NPCSC’s 
interpretation on the Ng Ka Ling case. There was no way it could get around with 
another vague statement. Rejecting the Interpretation would trigger a yet more 
severe constitutional crisis that it was unprepared to take.97 
The CFA did resist when the political risks were low enough. Chong Fung 
Yuen is an example that demonstrates such resistance.98 The NPCSC indicated in 
the Ng Ka Ling Interpretation that a post-enactment material was a conclusive 
indicator of the legislative intent of all subsections of art. 24(2), BL, although the 
subject articles of the Ng Ka Ling Interpretation were specifically limited to art. 
22(4) and subsection (3) of art. 24(2), BL.99 Two years later, the CFA in Chong 
Fung Yuen had to interpret subsection (1) of art. 24(2), BL. The CFA upheld 
common law rules of interpretation in defiance of the NPCSC’s will. It decided 
that only those parts of the Ng Ka Ling Interpretation that related to its subject 
articles were binding on HK courts; the NPCSC’s remarks on the legislative intent 
of non-subject articles were obiter.100 In the absence of any binding interpretation 
of subsection (1) of art. 24(2), the CFA applied common law rules of 
interpretation, which excluded consideration of the post-enactment material.101 An 
NPCSC spokesman responded immediately to the CFA’s defiance by stating that 
the CFA’s stance was inconsistent with the NPCSC’s understanding.102 Yet the 
NPCSC did not rebuke further. The CFA in this case successfully guarded off the 
trumping of Mainland norms over common law rules of interpretation, the 
speculation being that the NPCSC did not see any stake in this particular 
decision,103 and the CFA realised this. 
How the question of kompetenz-kompetenz in the Congo case will turn out 
is uncertain. Two points render it likely that the CFA will be tested with an 
interpretation that will be substantively at odds with the core of the BL. First, art. 
158(3), BL imposes the obligation to seek judicial reference on the CFA only, but 
                                                 
97 Tai, supra note 95. 
98 Chong Fung Yuen, supra note 59. 
99 Ng Ka Ling Interpretation, supra note 59, clause 2. 
100 Chong Fung Yuen, supra note 59, sections 7.3-8.3. 
101 Ibid. 
102 A spokesman for the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPCSC “expressed concern”. 
“Assembly Standing Committee concerned by abode case in Hong Kong.” BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific (Political) (21 July 2001). 
103 AYH Chen, “Another Case of Conflict Between the CFA and the NPCSC?” (2001) 31 HKLJ 
179 at 186. 
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 not on lower courts. The CFI and CA ruling on the case previously had no 
obligation to seek a preliminary ruling. Yet the CFA will be faced head-on with 
such an obligation and, hence possibly the decision of whether to yield to a 
possible claim of kompetenz-kompetenz by the NPCSC. Secondly, the fact that the 
PRC government has vested interests in the case increases the possibility of it 
imposing its will through a legislative interpretation of the BL. In the end, 
whether the CFA will accept (the likely) expansive interpretation by the NPCSC, 
thereby making a crucial surrender in the long-standing battle between the 
systems, will depend on the political wrestle in the circumstances.   
 
1.  Cut-off point? 
 
The pluralist contest and institutional dialogue can only go on if the HK judiciary 
does not take further, clear and sustained steps in accepting the NPCSC as final 
arbiter of disputes between the legal systems. It may not be easy to tell at which 
exact point the HK judiciary accepts unequivocally the ranking of the two legal 
systems. The relationship between co-existing legal systems is characterized by a 
spectrum, with a clearly monistic legal order on one end. On the other end of the 
spectrum is the clearly pluralist situation, where two or more legal orders make 
competing claims of supremacy with no clear arbiter. The relationship between 
the German courts and ECJ is an apt example of this end. Hovering in between is 
a range of situations where it is hard to tell if judges have accepted a hierarchy. 
HK lies somewhere here. Every answer that the HK judiciary gives to questions 
of hierarchy will push the two systems either closer to or further away from the 
monist end.  
From the pluralist’s perspective, what happened in HK was that initially 
one could not tell from the ambiguously worded BL if the HK or Mainland 
system ranks higher within HK territory. Since then the Mainland and HK legal 
systems have engaged in institutional dialogues, asserting rival claims of 
supremacy. The relationship between the systems started off by being on the 
clearly pluralist end. Yet over the years, the HK judiciary has accepted certain 
powers of the NPCSC, e.g. its power to interpret the BL free-standingly. This 
acceptance has become unequivocal as it has been consistently revealed in case 
law. Such clear acceptance pushes the Mainland-HK legal order further away 
from the pluralist end. If in future there are signs to show that the HK judiciary is 
accepting, without content restrictions, the NPCSC’s power of interpreting the 
BL, and such acceptance is sustained over a number of cases – then we can likely 
conclude that the Mainland-HK legal order has become monistic. This day may or 
may not come. The HK judiciary is resilient and capable of using techniques of 
restraint and detour to avoid giving clear answers to sensitive questions. What we 
know for sure is, before that day comes, the HK judiciary is equivocal regarding 
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 the ranking of the two legal systems, and will rival the Mainland’s claims of legal 
supremacy whenever the political stakes allow. The Mainland-HK legal order, as 
evolved over the years and as it currently stands, is definitely not monistic, is 
close to a pluralist description, but not as patently pluralist as the relationship 
between the German and EU legal systems.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This article has sought to challenge the common conception that the Mainland 
Chinese legal system and its HK counterpart are interacting in a monistic manner. 
I have argued that the Kelsenian theory of law is counter-intuitive, while the 
empirical premise of Hartian monists has not been established. This article 
suggests that, as compared to the classical monist and dualist theories, the dialogic 
relationship between HK courts and Mainland institutions is better encapsulated 
by the legal pluralist framework developed from EU jurisprudence. 
Reconceptualising the relationship between the Mainland and HK legal 
systems in a way that more accurately reflects its realities is, in and of itself, of 
academic interest. Yet the above analysis may be of significance to those 
interested in comparative law, constitutional law and constitutional theory 
generally. The articulation of a possible resemblance in pluralist legal patterns 
between the EU legal order and Chinese-HK legal order potentially opens up 
opportunities for future discourse between Europe and China on pluralism and 
other techniques of large-scale governance. Despite vast differences in history, 
culture, and political systems, the EU and China face common challenges brought 
about by economic globalisation and growing diversities across a continental-
sized population.104 The sharing of a pluralist legal phenomenon is but one 
example that bespeaks these common challenges.  
China’s experience may contribute to the vigourous debates on pluralism 
in Europe. The circumstances leading up to the formulation of OCTS will shed 
light on the normative value of pluralism; the stark power imbalance between 
China and HK will illuminate the role that political strength plays in sustaining a 
pluralist situation; the gradual shift of the Mainland-HK legal order towards the 
monist end of the spectrum reveals the importance of political restraint in 
maintaining pluralism. Due to limited space, these questions will have to be 
discussed elsewhere. This article sets the stage for further exchanges between 
China and Europe on these interesting issues, which will be of interest not only to 
                                                 
104 For discussions on how Europe and China face similar problems and their possible 
convergence on governance solutions, see e.g. M Jacques, When China Rules the World (Penguin 
Books, 2009) 220, 422-424; J Rifkin, The European Dream (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 
359-360. 
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 EU and China, but also to other states and polities that are rethinking models of 
governance in a post-Westphalian era.105  
                                                 
105 See S Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004) for a theory of the plurinational state.  
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